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The Journal of American History neath the canopy of republicanism was of critical significance for the eventual emergence of the Republican party.
In its beginning phase the Know Nothing movement attracted support from a broad spectrum of voters, and its success reflected a number of factors. For some voters it represented a momentary vehicle of protest; for others, especially homeless Whigs, it offered a temporary political refuge. Certainly, opportunistic politicians infiltrated the order's leadership and often diverted the movement to their own ends. Nevertheless, the Know Nothings' astounding electoral strength was not primarily the result of a temporary vacuum caused by the demise of the Whig party or by the effective manipulation of the masses by selfish elites.5 Instead, popular support for Know Nothingism stemmed in large measure from its extraordinary appeal, which combined opposition to the liquor traffic, hostility to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and a searing hatred of Catholics and immigrants and of politicians who pandered to them. With a program that blended unvarnished bigotry and a sincere desire for reform, the American party provided an outlet for the welling discontent in the electorate and pulled large numbers of northerners into its crusade.
Eventually the sectional controversy would divide the order, but at the outset American party newspapers and spokesmen throughout the free states took a clear stand against the extension of slavery. In states where the party ran separate candidates in 1854, no clear-cut choice existed on the Nebraska question: Voters could cast Know Nothing ballots and still express opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Even harsh Republican critics such as the New York Tribune conceded that "beyond a doubt the great body of Know-Nothings in the free States are Anti-Nebraska men. " In addition, several Free Soil leaders reported in dismay that many of their former party associates were, as George W. Julian phrased it, "crazy after Know Nothingism. 16 Voting patterns substantiate significant support for the nativist movement among third-party voters, particularly in New England, but it is important to recognize that in voting Know Nothing former Free Soilers did not surrender their 5 that it will be difficult to keep our party friends separated from their organization. "8
The prominence of so many Free Soilers in the American party organization and the strong voting ties between the two movements cannot be explained away as mere expediency. The classic example often cited is Henry Wilson, the erstwhile Free Soil leader who joined the nativist bandwagon as part of a calculated bid to be elected to the United States Senate. Wilson was a dedicated antislavery man, but he was hardly so free from the taint of nativism as is commonly assumed. As a newly elected senator in 1855, he raised antislavery eyebrows by actively seeking grounds of accommodation with proNebraska southern Know Nothings. Late in that year, after he had gone into the Republican party and no longer needed to cater to nativist sentiment, Wilson privately informed Salmon P. Chase that he was considering introducing a bill to extend the waiting period for naturalization from five to ten years. Contrary to later denials, he also supported Massachusetts's famous Two-Year Amendment.9
Like Wilson, rank-and-file Free Soilers generally placed first priority on the slavery issue, but it does not follow that they were indifferent to other concerns. Throughout the North during the decade, Free Soilers invariably supported protemperance candidates and in referenda voted almost unanimously to outlaw the sale of liquor. Moreover, although a majority of former Free Soilers in the Know Nothing coalition soon defected to the Republican party, a significant minority steadfastly adhered to the American party cause until the state organization abandoned its antislavery stance. (See table 1 Free Soilers who went to the polls presented an unbroken phalanx in support of the amendment. In a similar referendum in 1857 in Massachusetts, 1852 Free Soilers who turned out favored by a decisive margin a literacy test, and apparently virtually all third-party members who endorsed the amendment had joined the Know Nothings in 1854. For many northerners anti-Catholicism and antislavery, both deeply rooted in evangelical Protestantism, were not mutually exclusive attitudes, nor did they perceive any necessity of choosing politically between the two. As a Cleveland observer commented after a Know Nothing victory in that center of antislavery feeling, adherents to the American party cause "looked upon the questions of Nativism and Catholicism, in the abstract, as not at all conflicting with the cause of African freedom. " "0 Members of the dark lantern society, especially outside the largest cities, were also generally sympathetic to prohibition. In a number of states in 1854 and later, the order supported candidates who endorsed prohibition; in addition, on advisory referendums in Ohio and Pennsylvania, Know Nothings strongly favored banning the sale of alcohol, while in Connecticut independent temperance voters, the most ardent prohibitionists in the state, backed American party candidates by decided margins. The linkage between the two movements arose naturally, since for both Know Nothings and temperance crusaders besotted Irish Catholics functioned as their primary negativereference group. The Chicago Trbune, which merged reports of Irish drunkenness and disorder with nativist arguments, rhetorically asked, "Who does not know that the most depraved, debased, worthless and irredeemable drunkards and sots which curse the community, are Irish Catholics?" Asserting that the Catholic church's influence was "always directly in favor of drunkenness," it specifically endorsed the Maine Law as an anti-Catholic measure. 1 1 Overarching those considerations was the growing hostility to immigrants, especially Catholics, that swept across the North in the 1850s. Manuscript evidence of the potency of anti-Catholic feeling in those years is overwhelming, and critics and defenders alike concurred with the assessment of a leading Republicanism in Ohio, where the party won its first major victory, rested on a substantial nativist foundation.
Know Nothings were also particularly prominent in the formation of the Republican party in two New England states, Massachusetts and Maine. In the Bay State they formed a sizable contingent at the state convention, although some subsequently bolted after the delegates rejected American Gov. Henry J. Gardner's bid for renomination (he subsequently accepted the American nomination). Trying to tread a thin line between the nativist and antinativist factions in the new party, the Massachusetts Republican platform was confined to the slavery question and announced that party members were free to form their own opinion on other matters. Fusion between Republicans and Know Nothings was more harmonious in Maine, where the Republican state convention nominated Gov. Anson P. Morrill, who was either a member of the Know Nothing order or else intimately allied with its leaders, as the party's first standard bearer. In addition, the 1855 Maine Republican platform termed "the debasement of the right of suffrage" by naturalized voters "an alarming evil" and urged either strict enforcement or modification of the existing naturalization laws. Not surprisingly, the American party rejected a move to run a separate state ticket and endorsed Morrill and his fellow Republican nominees. 17 But it was in Pennsylvania that Know Nothings wielded the most complete control of the Republican party. So pervasive were nativist incursions into the party that the Republican state convention elected as chairman a man who secretly belonged to the order, and he subsequently packed the Republican state central committee with Know Nothings. The committee in turn withdrew the Republican nominee for canal commissioner and endorsed another candidate who, it was later confirmed, was an oath-bound member of the American party. In short, at the conclusion of the 1855 campaign the Republican party in the Keystone State was saddled with a Know Nothing state chairman, state committee, and state ticket.18 With the Republican party in the state stillborn, nativism was completely dominant in the Pennsylvania opposition. Taken His efforts culminated in the official call for the Republicans' first national convention, which assembled in Pittsburgh in February 1856. In drumming up support for the movement, the new governor's basic argument was that a coalition such as had been formed in Ohio-which meant significant Know Nothing participation and recognition-could carry the presidential election in the fall.22
The Connecticut state election in April 1856, the most important spring election in the North prior to the Republicans' national nominating convention in June, reinforced the meaning of the 1855 fall contests. For the first time, the Republican party directly challenged the heretofore dominant Know Nothings in the state. The Republican state platform focused exclusively on the slavery controversy, but in a calculated rebuke to the Know Nothings, the Republican convention rejected a nativist candidate and nominated Welles, a severe critic of Know Nothingism, to head the state ticket. The American platform and campaign, in contrast, continued to emphasize both nativism and antislavery. For Republicans, who had earlier pronounced the American party a dying force in the state's politics, the election results were a rude shock. The American incumbent polled almost four times as many votes as Welles, who finished a distant third with a mere 10 percent of the vote. Equally disconcerting, the Republicans failed to make significant inroads in the Know Nothings' base of support. Approximately two-thirds of previous Know Nothing voters remained loyal to their party, and of those who defected, three times as many went over to the Democrats as transferred their support to Welles.23 In failing to win substantial nativist accessions, the Republican party in Connecticut, as throughout much of the North, remained a hopeless minority with only six months to go until the presidential election.
As they looked ahead to the 1856 national contest, Republican strategists realized that a more concerted effort to win over American party voters was needed. and beyond, however, was not entirely attributable to the slavery issue. The antebellum voter's political universe did not orient exclusively toward national affairs; activities at the state and local level, where the bulk of nineteenth-century partisan combat was located, also shaped a party's image and molded its constituency. Even after the raid on Lawrence, Kansas, and the caning of Sen. Charles Sumner in the Senate chamber dramatically intensified sectional feeling, Republicans were unwilling to hazard everything on the slavery extension issue. In seeking to broaden the party's electoral base as well as to reinforce the existing loyalties of party members, Republican spokesmen raised a number of issues other than sectionalism of which anti-Catholicism was the most important.26
The Republican state and local platforms catered to nativists as well. The most significant example was the 1856 Union party platform in Pennsylvania, which condemned the interference of "foreign influence of every kind" in the nation's government, denounced the "pandering of any party to foreign influence," and pledged to defend the common school system, which Catholic bishops had attacked, from any attempt to pervert it to sectarian uses. The Indiana Republican platform in 1856 demanded abolition of alien suffrage, which allowed immigrants to vote in the state before they became citizens. The Republican convention in Iowa, rejecting German-sponsored resolutions that repudiated Know Nothingism and that endorsed the present system of naturalization, adopted instead a policy of silence on those matters. national platform managed to balance an appeal to Americans and the foreignborn in a single clause by promising to protect "liberty of conscience" and the "equality of rights among citizens." Liberty of conscience was a time-honored nativist phrase that referred to the right of individuals to interpret Scriptures for themselves and as such carried distinct anti-Catholic connotations. 30 Historians who argue that by 1856, after several years of great intensity, ethnic and religious tensions ceased to have political relevance, misconstrue the reality of antebellum northern politics. The great emphasis that leading Fillmore adherents gave to the false accusation that Fremont was a Catholic, which they invoked in an effort to shore up their deteriorating support in the face of the Republican onslaught, provided ample evidence of the continuing salience of ethnocultural issues. From the beginning of the 1856 campaign, Republicans were on the defensive with regard to their candidate's religious affiliation, and there seemed no limit to American party leaders' imagination in concocting evidence of Fremont's alleged Catholicism. One American journalist defended the great effort expended in circulating the charge with the confident prediction that "the great majority" of Protestant voters would consider the question of Fremont's Catholicism "of more importance than the false issue of 'Free Kansas.' "131
Republican strategists saw, as Weed admitted, that "the Catholic story is doing much damage." Schuyler Colfax reported that of the "hundreds of letters" he received from the Northwest, "scarcely any omits a reference to the fact that the Catholic story injures us materially, both in keeping men in the Fillmore ranks who ought to be with us, & in cooling many of our own friends who fear from Col. F's silence & the cloud of rumors on the subject in the K. N. papers, that there may be some truth in it. " Party managers tried to handle the issue in a number of ways, but to the end large numbers of northern voters believed that the Republican standard bearer was a Catholic. With justification the New York Mirror maintained that Fremont's supposed Catholicism was the most damaging charge leveled against him.32
The difficulties Republicans encountered in the controversy over Fremont's religion provide forceful evidence that anti-Catholicism remained an important element in northern politics in 1856, and that the Sumner and Kansas incidents, if they muted the intensity of ethnocultural concerns, did not eradicate them from the political system. Fear and hatred of Catholics continued to motivate many voters, and as a number of observers commented in 30 Republicans' adoption of anti-Catholicism was more than simply a campaign strategy. Republicans and Know Nothings shared fundamental values and attitudes that facilitated a union of the two groups. In particular, each party's ideology emphasized an existing threat to republican government. Nativist spokesmen insisted repeatedly that the order's purpose was to check the Catholic church's political power, which threatened republican government, and in no way was to interfere with the right of freedom of worship. Opposition to the political pretensions of the Catholic church could be easily incorporated into the Republican party's discussion of the threat to northern liberties and republican society. One of Seward's correspondents stressed that the central plank of the Republican platform ought to be "Opposition to Despotism-whether the seat of its power be in the papal chair of Rome or on a Cotton Plantation of the South." Solid Catholic support for the Democratic party, which was (Republicans charged) the ally of the Slave Power, the church's refusal to condemn slavery, and southern and Catholic denunciations of northern institutions such as free schools enabled Republicans to link the Slave Power and the Catholic church. Party spokesmen depicted a dual threat to republicanism-the Slave Power and the Papal Power-and though they gave greater emphasis to the former and considered it the more serious danger, they by no means ignored the latter. 42 Further strengthening the connection between the fear of the Slave Power and animosity toward the Catholic church was the growing affinity of evangelical Protestants for the Republican cause. Northern Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists evidenced a common hatred of Catholicism, a strong opposition to drink, and an intense dislike for slavery. Their presence in the Republican party helped to give it puritanical overtones, and Democrats labored hard throughout the decade to portray Republicans as a group of moral busybodies who sought to regulate other people's private lives. A New England paper emphasized the interrelationship of these issues for many voters when, in a variation of the phrase that would reverberate throughout postwar politics, it charged that the Democratic party was the champion of "Rum, Romanism and Slavery.' "43 By 1860 the Republicans were on the threshold of becoming the majority party in the North. In earlier state contests they had made alliances with the Know Nothings, had endorsed various pieces of nativist legislation, and in the process had won over many voters who had backed Fillmore in 1856. (See table  3 .) Still, it was essential that the Republicans not only retain the loyalty of the former Know Nothings but win additional accessions as well. Attracting sup- port from nativists remained a major concern for party managers when mapping strategy for the 1860 contest. Of the most populous northern states, only Ohio seemed safe. Illinois and Indiana were still under Democratic control, while in New York, as the 1859 state election clearly demonstrated, the remaining remnant of the American organization held the balance of power between the two major parties. Equally critical was Pennsylvania, where nativist influence was stronger in the anti-Democratic ranks than in any other state and where the People's party, representing a coalition of Republicans and Americans, had only recently managed to carry the state.
1856, a widespread belief that a presidential candidate was tainted with
The importance of the nativist element both inside and outside the Republican ranks played a major role in Lincoln's unexpected triumph at the 1860 Chicago convention. Historians traditionally attribute the rejection of Seward, the party's most prominent leader and the frontrunner for the nomination, to his radical antislavery reputation. Also critical, however, was the nativists' burning hatred of the New York leader, which the passing years had done nothing to extinguish. Nativist Republicans at Chicago asserted on the convention floor and in private caucuses that Seward would never receive sufficient backing from former Know Nothings and Fillmore supporters to carry the the slavery issue and continued to speak out for nativist reforms. Once again, disgruntled antislavery radicals entered a protest candidate, who received a token 213 votes. An extraordinarily gifted political operator, Banks refused to discard nativism after he became governor, despite heavy pressure from some Republicans, and was closely identified with the Two-Year Amendment. He exploited both antislavery and nativism to win three terms as the state's chief executive, much to the chagrin of frustrated radicals, before he voluntarily retired in 1860. In short, in its electoral base, its leadership, and its public policy, the Republican party of Massachusetts displayed unmistakable evidence of the continuing influence of nativism. 47 To account for the Republican party's success and the Know Nothings' corresponding eclipse, historians have emphasized a number of factors: the Republicans' extraordinarily skillful leadership, the crescendo of sectionalism, the Know Nothings' squandering of many of their advantages, and the American party's sorry performance in office. Also crucial was the Republican party's blatant solicitation of nativist support. By helping to win over those former adversaries, the Republicans' adoption of various strands of nativist thought and their recognition of former Know Nothings in the distribution of party honors were significant factors in the creation and maintenance of a Republican majority in the North.
Still, one must be careful not to minimize the importance of sectional tensions in bringing Know Nothings into the Republican party. Observers inside and outside the order reported extensive defections among rank-and-file American party members during the summer of 1856 following the alleged "sack of Lawrence" and the assault on Sumner. The vast majority of Northerners who joined the Know Nothing lodges in 1854 and 1855 were antislavery extension as well as nativist in sentiment, and they voted for the American party because it represented both principles. At the party's 1855 and 1856 national conventions, northern Know Nothing leaders bluntly warned that a proslavery platform would destroy the order's strength in the North. American Gov. William Minor of Connecticut explained that had the northern delegates endorsed the 1855 platform, "the American party would have been blown to atoms in every Northern state.' '48 As those leaders predicted, when the party dropped its anti-slavery extension position in 1856, thousands of members deserted it for the Republicans precisely because the Republican appeal emphasized both sectionalism and nativism. The Republican party's success in 1856 and later demonstrated, as the 1854 elections had as well, that the strongest political party in the North was one that combined opposition to the Slave Power with anti-Catholicism.
Contemporary observers recognized the role of Know Nothingism in the Republican party's eventual rise to power. The Know Nothing movement, one Ohio Republican commented, "was simply a stepping-stone" for disaffected Whigs and Democrats on their way to becoming Republicans. Julian added his voice to that testimony. Far from a defender of the secret society, he nevertheless called it "a sort of 'underground railroad"' by which Whigs and Democrats "generally made their exodus from their former political masters" into the Republican ranks.49 Julian's imagery was particularly apt and no doubt came naturally to a radical antislavery man. Greeted with great fanfare, the Know Nothing train got off to a fast start, only to suffer a series of derailments that ultimately left it wrecked beyond repair. In the course of those developments, the large majority of the passengers on that railroad disembarked, some sooner, some later, at the station known as "The Republican Party. " 
